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Since  Akerlof's  (1970)  seminal  study  of the sorting effects  of 
prices  in the used car market,  the implications  of adverse selection  in 
the presence  of informational  asymmetries  has been an active area of 
economic  research.  This is especially  true  with regard  to the labor 
market,  where Informational  asymmetries  arise  naturally  between 
individuals  who know  their  productivity  and firms who don't, or between 
current  employers  who have learned  the quality  of their workers  and 
potential  employers  who remain  uninformed.  The former  Informational 
asymmetry  appears,  for example,  in Weiss (1980).  who shows  that  it can 
lead firms to make rigid  wage  offers  accompanied  by layoffs.  The latter 
informational  asymmetry  has been  studied  by Greenwald  (1986), who 
examines  its dampening  effect on the interfirm  mobility  of labor. 
Recently,  several  authors  have emphasized  the role of sectoral 
shocks  which  require  the reallocation  of an economy's  productive 
resources  as an empirically  Important  source  of unemployment  (Lilllen, 
982,  Summers, '986).  Such structural  unemployment  makes  sense  only in 
the presence  of some  form  of "friction"  in the labor  market,  which  acts 
to diminish  the Intersectoral  mobility  of labor.  Labor market 
informational  asymmetries  represent  one possible  source  of this 
friction. 
We consider  the informational  asymmetry  analyzed  by Greenwald,  but 
do so in a two sector model.J This allows  us to explore  the 
Implications  of asymmetric  information  in the presence  of sectoral 
shocks,  the existence  of which  give rise  to a need for reallocation  of —2 
the labor force across sectors2"  We show that, when current employers 
have more information about worker quality than do potential employers, 
sectoral shocks give rise to structural unemployment,  That is,  some 
workers laid off from the injured sector remain unemployed in 
equilibrium despite the fact that they are of sufficient quality to be 
productively employed somewhere in the economy at the prevailing wage. 
The source of' this market failure  is the inability of potential 
employers to distinguish the abilities of workers within the pool of 
unemployed. 
We also show that sectoral unemployment rates are not monotonic  in 
the severity of sectoral shocks.  For  small shocks,  unemployment 
increases  in the injured sector and falls in the favored sector, 
However,  for larger shocks these relationships are reversed due to the 
interaction of layoff and hiring decisions.  For  larger shocks, firms in 
the declining sector layoff  more,  higher ability  workers,  which 
increases the  average ability of the pool of  unemployed in that 
sector.  The quality effect induces firms in the favored sector to hire 
from that  pool  more agesslvely,  substituting  these workers for 
marginal  incumbent workers.  This substitution reduces  unemployment in 
the injured sector  and raises it in the expanding  sector. 
Finally,  we  show that equilibrium employment decisions  are not 
constrained Pareto efficient.  In making layoff decisions,  firms  in the 
injured sector  ignore  an  important externality.  The marginal retained 
worker  has  greater ability  than the average  laid—off  worker.  Thus if 
injured firms were to layoff more, higher quality workers, this would —3— 
increase the average  quality of workers that relooate in the favored 
sector.  Thus from an eff  iciency standpoint,  even  more layoffs in the 
declining sector would  be desirable.  Adjustment assistance, in the form 
of a subsidy to workers leaving employment in the injured sector, 
internalizes  this externality. 
We  explore tnese issues in the context of a small, two sector, two 
period •  open  economy subject to random terms of trade shocks.  The model 
is developed in section II.  Section XII characterizes the equilibrium 
adjustment  of labor markets.  Section IV characterizes  unemployment 
rates as a function of terms of trade shocks, while section  V  examinem 
tne efficiency role for trade adjustment assistance.  Section VI 
concludes. 
II.  The Model 
Consider a small  open  economy with two sectors  Cs - 1,2)  and two 
periods  t  —  1,2).  The economy is endowed with a  continuum  of workers 
with mass  II.  A worker is of uncertain quality  q.  The distribution of 
quality across the economy's  wcrkforce is described by  the 
differentiable cumulative distribution function  11(q);  let 
h(q)  • 11'Cq).  Define 
1(q) '  x dHCx)/H(q). 
1(q)  is the average quality of that portion of the labor force which 
includes only workers of quality  q  or below.  • Z(—)  is the (finite) population mean.  Finally, we assume that  Z(q)  is concave 
and  K(q)  has full support on the nonnegative real line.  The concavity 
of  Z(q)  will be used to ensure uniqueness of the equilibrium derived 
in the next section (see Remark 3). 
For  future reference define 
L(q)  f x dH(x). 
M.L(q)  gives the economy's effective labor force counting only workers 
of quality  p  or above. 
Firms are risk neutral and discount period 2 profits  by the factor 
.  Each firm requires  k  units of capital to operate; this investment 
is nondepreciating and irreversible.  K  k.N  is the economy's 
exogenous total capital stock, and  N  is the number of firms in the 
economy.  Firms allocate themselves across sectors in period 1  so that 
the expected  (two period) return to capital Is the same in each 
sector.  There is no entry or exit of firms in perIod 2. 
The two sectors are symmetric and thus have an equal number of 
firms in equilibrium.  All firms share the same production function 
f(.)  which gives a firm's output as a function of  its effective labor 
force.  We assume that: 
f'(•) > 0; t''(.) < 0; f'(O)  f'()  0. 
Goods prices are given each period by the rest of the world, and 
units are chosen so that the first period price in each sector is 
unity.  Second period prices are identically and independently —5— 
distributed  draws from a cumulative distribution function  0(P).  We 
assume that  0(P)  has  full support on the nonnegative real line, 
Firms make period 1  labor hiring decisIons with no information 
about individual worker quality,  In response to relative price changes, 
firms then make period 2 labor hiring decisions knowing the quality of 
each of their own period I  employees.  However, no firm can observe 
directly the quality of workers it has not employed previously.  As we 
show below, this period 2 informational asymmetry can impede efficient 
intersectoral labor movements and lead to structural unemployment in the 
presence of terms of trade shocks. 
The  N firms in each sector make Identical period I  hiring arid 
production decisions given a first period  wage  W.  W  is determined in 
equilibrium by a (period 1)  labor market clearing condition that we 
discuss later.  For now we maintain the assumption of full employment in 
period 1: each firm employs  m  workers. 
Observing period 2 prices  P1  and  P2,  each firm makes a period 
2 employment decision.  A firm knows only the ability of  its 
incumbent  workers.  If'  it retains workers above quality  q,  then its 
effective retained labor force is  mL(q);  if a firm employs only 
incumbent workers above quality  q  its output is  f(rnL(q)). 
We characterize labor market institutions as follows.  After 
observing period 2 prices, a firm makes wage offers to incumbent 
workers, which they might either accept or reject.  Different offers 
might be made to different workers; a worker is "laid off" if'  offered a 
wage below the opportunity wage, —6— 
The reservatior wage at which a worker is indifferent between 
working  and not is determined by  the expenditure funotioâ 
— e(P1,P2). 
All workers are  assumed  to have identical preferences and a coon 
reservation  utility level1"  .  ignore period 1  laying by scrkers, so 
that period 2 utility depends only on periâd 2  prices and labor 
income.  We also  assume that each worker possesses a single indivisible 
unit of labor services  (of varying quality)  that might be either 
aupplied or wfthheld from the labor larkeb. 
The expenditure  function is liner hcmogenous, differenti6li 
increasing and  concav. in prides.  We also assume that it is sytâetric and 
satisfies  a boundary condition;  e(1,p) • e(pl)  and  e(1,O)  a 
Thus  • 
(P2/P1)  goes to zero  (w0/P1)  goes  to zero;  The 
relevance of this will be made clear  in the next section  (see Remark 1). 
Workers  rejecting their wage offer from period  1  employers go to a 
sector-specific labor hiring hall.  Knowing individual work history but 
not worker qualtity, firms can go to either labor hiring hall and hire 
new workers at a market clearing wags. 
Several facts about  equilibrium  employment decisions are apprent 
from these assumptiOns.  First, no labor Is ever employed  at a wage 
below the reeeivation wags  w0.  Second. retained workers are paid the 
equilibrium wage in the labor hiring hall for their sector.  Third, due 
to symsetry,  firms never hire new workers from their own sector's hiring 
1.111/  a —7— 
III.  Equilibrium Responses to Sectoral Shocks 
We now characterize period 2 equilibrium conditions for any pe'iod 
2 relative price realization, assuming symmetric full employment in 
period  1  by the  firms  in each sector.  The characterization is 
particularly simple for a second period relative price realization of 
unity, i.e., in the absence of a second period terms of'  trade shock. 
This is because the quality composition of the labor hiring halls  in the 
two  sectors will be identical in this case.  Since firms never find 
quality in their own sector hiring halls sufficient to generate hiring 
activity, and since in the absence of a second period terms of trade 
shock the quality composition of each hiring hail is the same, no -iring 
will occur from either hall.  Moreover,  since retained workers are paid 
the equilibrium wage in the hiring hall for their sector, the economy— 
wide lack of hiring activity Implies that all retained workers receive 
the reservation wage  w0. 
Clearly for second period relative price  realizations close to 
one, the quality composition of each sector's hiring hall will still be 
sufficiently similar to keep the hiring halls inactive, and retained 
workers will still be paid their reservation wage  w0.  We now determine 
the range of second period relative prices for which this will be 
true.  To this end, suppose that given the sectoral labor wage  w5  and 
goods price  P5  there were no hiring by sector  s  firms of any new 
workers,  i.e. only incumbent workers were employed In sector  s.  Then 
each firm in sector  s  would be willing to retain all new workers above —8— 
quality  q5  satisfying the first order condition for profit 
maximization 
(1)  P5f'(mL(q5))q5 
— 
w5. 
Equation (1) has a  unique implicit solution 
q5 a 
Q(w5/P51m) 
that is increasing in both arguments.  Thus, without any interseotoral 
labor real]ooation,  worker  retention decisions depend  on a seotor' 
specific lagS—price ratio (and 1 period 1  hiring deóision.) 
If lAbor  hiring huh  sri inictive  •  then workers in eich sector 
repaid the reservation wigs, i.e.. w5 a 10.  Then the  marginal 
retained worker in sector  1  is of quality 
a Q(e(t,P2/P1),m) • 
where use has been made  of the linear homogeneity of the expenditure 
function.  Sector  2  has a syetrio relationship  q2 a UP1 /P2,m).  This 
function is increasing  in both arguments.  Moreover,  T(O,m)  a 0;  as 
P2/P1  gon to são sector 1  (the favored sector) retains all of its 
workers. 
Define the function 
o(p,m) • T(p,m)/Z(U1/p,m)). —9— 
.ttus, if  '  then  Q(p,m)  is the ratio of the quality of the 
marginal retained worker in sector 1  to the average quality of workers 
laid off in sector 2,  assuming  that labor hiring halls are tot active. 
Lera 1.  QCp,m)  is a  continuous increasing function of  p. 
Q(O,m)  —  0  and  Q(1,m)  >  1.  Thus  given  m  there exists a 
unique  p', 0 C p C  1,  such  IUp',m)  • 1. 
Proof.  Since  T(p,m)  is continuous and increasing  in  p  and 
Z(q)  is differentiable and  increasing in  q, Q(p,m)  must be 
continuous  and  increasing In  p.  QCO,m)  —  0  follows from 
cC 1,0) — 0  while  Q(1,uz)  >  1  follows from the definition of 
Z'q). 
Remark 1.  eCI,0) 
—  0  sssures that  p'  is well-defined. 
Otherwise,  Q(p,m)  might exceed  unity for all realizations of 
p,  and equilibria would never have any reallocation between 
sectors. 
Labor hiring halls will be  inactive and retained workers  paid 
their reservation wage in equilibria  whenever 
1  S lip". 
To see this, let  p • 
P2iP1  1,  so that  sector I is "fawored"  and 
sector 2 "injured."  If retained workers are paid  w0  and hiring halls 
are  inactive, then firms in sector I retain workers above 
— TCp,m),  while firms in sector two retain workers above —10- 
q2 — T(1/p,m).  Moreover,  p  1  implies that  q1  S  q2  and 
1(q2)  1(q1). 
If  p  p*  also, then  0(p) 2  1  implies 
q1 
) 
1(q2).  Hence 
q2￿q1 Z(q2) Z(q1) 
and firms in neither sector have any  incentive to hire a random worker 
from either hiring hall at any  wage above the resei'vation wage  we 
If, on the other  hand,  p • 
P2/P1 
<  p*,  then  0(p) C 1  and 
k 1(q2) 
) 
q1 k 1(q1); 
Firms in sector 1  now have a strictly positive  incentive to hire workers 
laid of f from  sector 2; otherwise  the marginal retained workórs in 
sector  1  firm would  be lower quality than average workers laid of  f in 
sector 2,  and the expected profits of sector  1  firms could be increased 
by substituting the latter for the former at the reservation wage2' 
There we two oases to consider if  p •  C p5.  In the first 
case, hiring halls olear at the reservation wage.  In the second case, 
seotor  1  fIrms have an excess  demand for laid off sector 2 workers at 
the reservation  wage, and the equilibrium sector  2 wage must rise to 
clear the market. 
If  p •  C  ps  and all employed workers are paid the 
reservation wage, then workers above  q2 
—  T(1/p,m)  are retained in the 
injured sector 2.  Sector  I  firms retain only workers above quality  q1 
—  1(q2)  and demand  ii  additional workers from sector 2's hiring hall, 
where  u  satisfies the first order condition for profit maximization. —1 — 
P1f'(mL(Z(q2))  iZ(q2)).Z(q2) 




D(e(1  ,p),Z(q2)  ,m). 
Define the excess demand function for labor in sector 2's nir  Log 
hail by sector I  firms hiring at the reservation wage as 
(2)  E(p)  D(e(l,p), Z(Y(l/o,m)),m) — rnH(Y(l/p,m)) 
We assume for convenience that  E(p)  is decreasing in  p  over the 
range  0 <  p < p*.  This assures that there is a unique  p  less than 
p such that excess demand is zero. 
Lemma 2.  There exists  p,  0 ( p** < p*,  such that  E(p**) 
0,  E(p)  > 0  for  0  < p < p,  and  E(p) < 0  for 
p**  < p  p. 
Proof.  For  p—O,  we have that  e(1,p)  0,  Since  f'()  0, 
it follows that  •(0)  f'1(0)  and thus that 
D(e(1,p), Z(q2),m) 
= .  Therefore,  E(0) = .  For  pp  it 
follows from  Q(p*m)1  that  e(i,p*) = 
f'(mL(Z(q2))) 
which 
implies in turn that  D(e(l,p*), Z(q2),m) 
= 0.  Thus, E(p*)  <  0. 
The lemma then follows from the fact that  E(p)  is continuous 
in  p  and our  assumption that  E(p)  is decreasing in  p  over 
the relevant range. —12— 
Remark 2,  If  E(p)  were not decreasing in  p  over the relevant 
range, there could exist disjoint intervals on which the 
inequalities stated in the lemma fail.  However, E(p) > 0  for 
p  suffIciently close to zero nd  E(p) < 0  for  p  sufficiently 
close to  p. 
Lemma 2 establishes that the sector 2 labor hiring ball  is active 
and clears at the reservation wage if  p  < (PIP)  <  If 
<  then there is an excess demand in this market at the 
reservation wage, and so the sector 2 wage must rise to clear the 
market.  Workers in sector 2 will  now be paid a wage  w > w0,  and 
workers above  q2 = Q(w/F2,m)  will be retained.  All workers laid off 
from sector 2 are hired by sector  1  fIrms at the wage  w.  Firms  in 
sector 1  retain workers above quality  q1  at the reservation wage, 
where  q1  satisfies the first order condition for profit maximization 




Finally, market clearing for the sector 2 labor market requires 
f'(mEq — L(q2)  + L(q.1)J)Z(q2) 
= 
which,  using (3), implies  that 
w  e(1/p,1) 
P2Z(q2)  q 
Using this and the fact that —13— 
(4) f'(mL(q2flq2  w/P2 
yields 
(5) 
f'(sL(q2))q2/z(q2)  e(1/p,1)/q1. 
Lemma 3.  For a given value of  p, 0 < p <  equations  (3), 
() and (5)  have a unique solution in  q1, q2,  and  w/P2. 
Proof'.  Equation (3) establishes a monotonically  increasing 
relationship between  q1  and  q2.  Equation (5)  establishes a 
decreasing relationship, with  q1  going to zero as  q2  goes to 
infinity, and  q2  going to zero as  q  goes to infinity.  Thus 
equations  (3) and  (5) have a unique solution in  q1  and  q2, 
with  w/P2  determined by equation  (a). 
Remark  3.  The concavity of  Z(q)  establishes a monotonic 
relationship between  q1  and  q2  in equation  (5),  which 
establishes uniqueness but is unnecessary for existence.  By 
selecting the equilibrium with  the lowest value of  w/P2,  the 
assumption can  be  dropped. 
It may  seem  paradoxical  that workers from the injured sector might 
be  paid a higher wage, but there is a natural intuition for this.  Our 
assumed  labor market institutions imply that workers in each sector are 
paid their opportunity wage, which is determined in part by the  average 
quality of the stock of workers laid off from that sector.  Layoffs are greater in the injured sector, and since layoffs are ordered by quality, 
the average quality of laid off workers in that sector is greater. 
Thus, if demand for labor in the favored sector is sufficiently great, 
the wage for workers in the injured sector can be higher. 
This provides a complete characterization of period 2 equilibrium 
when sector 2  is the injured sector, i.e.  P1 
> 
P2.  Relationships  are 
symmetric when sector  1  13 injured.  We summarize these results in the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 1.  Let  p  (P2/P1)  and  p satisfy  Q(p*)  1. 
Then  p* < 1  and there exists  p**,  C < p** < p*,  such that: 
(a)  If  p  < p < 1/p*,  then labor hiring halls are not active 
and retained workers In both sectors are paid the reservation 
wage. 
(b)  If p  < p < p*  or  1/p* <  p < 1/p**,  then the favored 
sector hires workers laid off from the Injured sector and all 
employed workers are paid the reservation wage. 
(c)  If  0 < p < p  or  p > 1/p**,  then the favored sector 
hires all workers laid off from the injured sector, retained 
workers in the favored sector are paid the reservation wage, and 
all workers previously employed  In the injured sector are paid a 
wage above the reservation wage. 
To close the model, we describe equilibrium in period  1.  Since —15— 
the  relevant technical conditions are cumbersome and not particularly 
enlightening we do so cursorily.  With superscripts  d  and  f  denoting 
the injured and  favored sector, respectively, second period profits in 
the two sectors are given by 
d  d  d  d  d  d  dr  d 
TI  (P ,w  ,q  ,m)  P f(mL(q  )) 
—  U  mLl—!-i(q  )) 
f  f  f  d  f  d  f  f  d 
TI  (p  ,w ,w ,q  ,q  ,u,m)  =  P  f(mL(q )  +  uZ(q  )) 
f.  f  d  — w  mLl—I-i(q  )] —  w  j 
where  qf,  qd,  and  i  are chosen by profit maximizers and  w and 
clear labor markets as determined above.  The period I  wage is then 
given by the labor market clearing condition 
- -  311f() 
U  f'(mq)q + 
P2  3m  dC(P2) 
+  1 
p2 
> 
p1  3m  dG(P2)} dG(P1) 
By the envelope theorem, the right hand side of this expression is just 
the  discounted two period marginal revenue product of labor with 
syrmnetric  first period full employment. 
To have labor fully employed in the first period,  U  must be 
above the period I  reservation wage  U0.  This will be the case provided 
that the size of the labor force  II  and the discount factor  are not 
"too large."L"  Finally, positive discounted expected profits will accrue 
as a rent to the owners of capital. -16- 
IV  Unep1oyment 
In this section we describe the nature of the unemployment that 
arises  in the second period of the model, and show that structural 
unemployment can result from a terms of trade shock.  We take structural 
unemployment to refer to the situation in which a portion of the workers 
laid off from the injured sector remain unemployed in equilibrium 
despite the fact that they are of sufficient quality to be productively 
employed somewhere in the economy at the reservation wage. 
Suppose that sector 1  is the favored sector and sector 2 is the 
injured sector;  p  (P2/P1) 
<  1.  Define the sectoral effective 
unemployment rate in the second period as the fraction of a sector's 
first period effective labor force that does not find employment 
somewhere in the economy in period 2..  The period 
I  effective labor 
force in each sector is  with  q  L(O).  Thus  the  period 2 
effective unemployment rate in the favored sector  1  is 
=  1  — L(q1)/L(D). 
where  q1  is the marginal retained worker in sector  1  Matters are a 
bit more complicated for the injured sector, since some of the workers 
laid off from this sector might be rehired in sector 1; the effective 
unemployment rate for sector 2 is 
U2 




q2  is the marginal worker retained in sector 2, and  pZ(q2)  is the 
amount of effective labor per firm that is laid off  in sector 2 and —1?— 
rehired in sector 1 •  The  values of  q1,  q2,  and  p  depend on the 
terms of trade shock  p,  as described in the previous section. 
To  see  how effective unemployment rates depend  on the terms of 
trade shock,  consider first the case with the second period relative 
price remaining at its first period  value;  p 
—  1.  Then  q1 
—  — 




—  1 
—  YC1,m))/q sUn. 
Un  is the "natural" rate of unemployment in each sector.  It's level 
reflects only the  underlying quality ccmposition of the labor force. 
Moreover, since the marginal  product of labor is equated across sectors, 
and  is equal to the reservation wage, labor is allocated efficiently. 
Hence the natural  rate of  unemployment is not structural in nature. 
Next, suppose that  p <  1  and consider the favored sector, sector 
1 •  Frcm our  previous analysis we  mow  that no worker laid off in the 
favored  sector is ever rehired  by the injured sector •  However,  this 
unemployment is not structural,  because the marginal worker laid off in 
sector I  is of lower quality  than the marginal worker  retained in sector 
2; i.e.  q1  q2.  Since the marginal productivity of a  q1  woricer in 
sector 1  is just equal to the reservation wage,  and the marginal 
productivity of that worker in sector  2 is lower, it follows  that no 
worker laid off in sector I can be productively employed  anywhere  in the 
econcmy.  Thus,  if struotural unemployment exists it must  be found in 
the injured sector 2. —18— 
Suppose  that  1  ) p  p*,  so that  the tern of trade shook  is 
"sean".  Then from Proposition I  p , 0,  and unemployment in the 
injurd sector is 
U2 
—  1  —  L(2)/L(O) 
There is no hiring hall activity, and  q2— UlIp,m).  For prices in 
this range, .unemployment in the injured sector rises above the natural 
rate  (i.e.  U2 ) Un),  and the amount of effective unemployment is 
increasing in the size of the ahock.  Conversely, unemployment in the 
favored eector is below the natural rate  and is decreasing inthi  size 
of the shock. 
.Mcieover, for relative prices in this range, acme of the 
unemployment in the injured sector is structural.  A portion of wärkers 
laid off in sector 2 are of sufficient quality to be productively 
employed in seotcr I  •  This follows frcm  q2  >  q1.  The marginal product 
of retained workers in sector 1 is equated to the reservation wage. 
However,  the marginal retained worker in sector 2 is of higher quality 
than the marginal retained worker in sector 1, and therefore would  have 
a  strictly higher  marginal product if employed  in sector 1. 
Nevertheless, none of the high quality workers laid off in the 
injured sector are  picked up by  firms  in the favored sector.  High 
quality laid off workers are unable to distinguish  themselves frcm 
others in the injured sector's  unemployment pool •  The  average quality 
of these unemployed workers is not sufficient to generate any hiring 
interest by favored sector firms; i.e.  Z(q2) C  q1.  Thus structural —19— 
unemployment is an equilibrium phenomenon  in sector 2 for relative rice 
shocks in tne range  1  ) p  p5. 
Consider  cext the  behavior of unempoyment rates for larger terms 
of trade shocks characterized by seocr.d  pertod relative prices tI'at 
satisfy  p5  > p  > p*0.  In tnis case,  each firm in the  favored sector 
employs 
ii a (,(e(1,p)/Z(q2)) 
— 
mL(Z(q2))]/Z(q2) 
units of labor from  the hiring hall of tne injured sector.  The 
corresponding effective  unemployment rate in the injured sector is 
U2 
—  1 
—  + ,aZi2m.(3). 
The qualitative behavior of this ueeasre of  inemployment depends  on two 
effects. 
Since sector 2 firms do  not hire any  new wor,cers  from labor hiring 
halls,  q2 a  Y(1/p,m)  is the marginal retained .,orice in the injured 
sector •  Thus  the fraction of worars retained in sector  2 
is inoreasing in  p.  However, the fraction of laid—off 
sector 2 effective workers that are rehired  by sector 1, 
pZCq2)/mtCO).  is deoreasing in  p.21  Depending on the relative 
strengths  of these two effects,  the sector  2 unemployment rate,  U2, 
may  not be monotonic in  p  over  the range  p* ) p  )  p55 
Nevertheless, as  p  goes to  p'5,  p  goes to  dI(q2)  and therefore 
U2  must go to zero.  Consequently,  U2  must be inoreasing with  p  in 
this range that are sufficiently close to  p'5. —20- 
Note, however, that structural unemployment persists in the 
injured seotqr as long as 
U2  > 0,  since the quality composition in the 
sector 2 hiring halls is unaffected by the hiring activity of sector  1 
firms.  Since sector  1  firms  cannot directly observe the quality of an 
individual worker, these firms must hire new workers arbitrarily. 
Since  q2 ) q1 •  there will remain workers in sector 2's unemployment 
pool who  could be productively employed in sector 1  at the reservation 
wage,  but who are not.  Thus structural unemployment persists until 
U2  is driven to zero. 
Paradoxically, unemployment in the  favored sector I is also non- 
monotonic  in the size of the shock.  That is, unemployment may  increase 
in sector 1  even as conditions improve in that sector •  This phenomenon  00cm 
for relative price realizations in the intprval  pt'  p ( p'. 
In this case, sector I firms rehire a positive  quantity of labor from 
sector 2, although some  unemployment remains  in the injured sector whose 
labor hiring hall  is clearing at the reservation wage.  The 
corresponding optimal retention rule for sector 1  firms is to equate the 
marginal quality of retained workers to the  average quality of  new 
workers;  q1 
—  Z(q2).  Since  Z(q2)  is increasing in the size of the 
shook Cu better quality workers are laid off from sector 2),  so must 
be  q1,  and  unemployment in sector I  must rise. 
Finally,  oonsider  very large terms of trade shocks for which 
0 < p < p".  In this case  p 
— 
irM(q2);  laid off workers in sector 2 
are fully rehired by firms in sector  I •  Thus  the effective unemployment 
rate in the injured sector is zero.  On the other hand, the optimal —21— 
retention  decision for  sector 1  is still to equate the marginal eve  e 
product of incumbent workers to the reservation wage.  Unemployment 
sector  1  persists, even though it oust vanish  in the limit as  p  goes 
to zero.  This follows from our assumption that the distribition of 
labor quality has full support on the posItive real line.  Thus there 
exist very low quality worers  wno are  unproductive in sector I  for sri 
positive price realizatLon.  Moreover, these laid off worgers fron 
sector  1  are not rehired in sector 2 where they are even less 
productive. 
Figure 1  summarizes this discussion by depicting  U1  and  as 
functions of  p  P2/P1. 
As described above,  rJ,  U2  -1n  at 
p  1,  and  there  is  no  structural  unemployment.  For 
I  > p  >  P, 
effective unemployment declines monotonically  in the favored sector 
and increases monotonically in the injured sector 2.  For 
p*  >  p  > p**,  sector  1  firms substitute labor from the sector 2 niring 
hail for their own marginal workers;  U1  rises, while  U2  eventually 
falls reaching  zero at  p.  Finally, for  0 K p K  p,  2 
remains  at 
zero, while  U1  falls asymptotically to zero. 
An inverse mirror image of these patterns characterizes 
unemployment rates In the converse case where  p >  1  and sector 2 is 
the favored sector.  Finally, note that structural unemployment, as 
defined above, exists at any price realization different from unity that 
leaves a positive unemployment rate in the injured sector.  e  summarize 
these results. —22— 
Proposition 2.  A second period terms of trade shook  leads to 
struotQral unemployment unless  the shock is sufficiently large to 
eliminate unemployment altogether  in the injured sector. 
Moreover,  sectcral unimployment rates are not in general  monotonic 
inthe size of the shock. 
V.  Adjustment  Assistence 
In this section we explore the possibility of welfare improving 
government  intervention.  In particular, we examine the effects of a 
government  prcgi'sm to assist  workers in moving frcm  the injured to the 
favored Sector in the second period.  ml adjustment assistance  is 
assumed to take the form It  an "exit subsidy" offered to• any worker who 
is willinj to leave  the injw'ed sector and sesrch for work elsewhere in 
the econcmy, i.e. go to the labor hiring hall. 
As noted  in section III the first period of the model  is 
chsracterized by full employment,  with labor (and capital) symmetrically 
allocated across sectors.  Since the second period adjustment  assistance 
program will,  cx ante, have symmetric effects on second period  profits 
in the two sectors, it Will not effect the sectoral allocation in the 
first p*iod of either capital or labor (though the first period wage 
will be affected)  and thus will leave unaltered the first period output 
levels and full Imployment  condition that prevail absent intervention. 
As  such, assuming that lump sum instruments  are available for 
redistribution, any changes in welfare brought about  by the  adjustment 
program will be found in the second period. —23— 
In the presence of lump sin redistributive instrur.ents,  second 
period welfare is neasured by the value of  production, measured at wrd 
prices  •  plus the  val a of unemployed labor •  measured at the reservation 
wage.  Assume  as before that sector 1  is the relatively favored  sector; 
p • 
P2/P1 
C  1.  Employment decisions determine the marginal  retained 
worker in each sector  (q1  and  q2)  and the amount of labor 
reallocated frau sector 2  to sector 1  Cu).  Constrained  Pareto 










—  p/rn] 
q1 ,q2,;& 
subject to  iII(q2)  ii  0. 
This definition of constrained efficiency presaes that  the 
tanner  also  cannot identify  the ability of laid off workers. 
Consequently, structural unemployment is consistent with this notion of 
constrained efficiency.  In this sense, structural unemployment might  cm 
viewed as an inevitable consequence if asyimsetric information about 
workers'  abilities,  and  the  absence  of institutions to ooemunioate that 
information.  In principle a planner  could gain information on worcer's 
ability by receiving ooemunications from sector 1  firms, who have a weak 
incentive to be truthful, and do even better (Harris and Townsend I $1, 
Holmstrom  and Myerson  1983).  We shall show that  without intervention 
equilibrium employment  decisions fail our  stricter definition of constrained efficiency for sufficiently large shocks, but that a policy 
of adjustment  assistance can rectify this. 
Constrained efficiency requires that  (favored)  sector I  firms 
equate the marginal revenue product of the marginal retained worker to 
the resevation wags; 
(6)  P1f(mI(q) 
+ 
pZ(q2))q1  a 
w0. 
If  0,  so  that some labor is reallocated  from  the injured to the 
favored óector,  then the marginal reveâue product of the average 
reallocated  worker must be greater than or equal to the reservation 
wage; 
(7) 
P1f'(m14q1) + pZ(q2))Z(q2)  w0. 
If  dflq2)  >  p > 0,  so that some but not all laid off labor from the 
injured sector is reallocated to the favored sector, then relation (7) 
must  hold with equality. 
finally, a necessary condition for an optimal retention decision 






+  eP1f'(mL(Z(q2)) 
• pZ(q2))q2 
where. e — 
p/mH(q2) 
is the fraction of laid off sector  2 firms hired  in 
sector 1.  This condition is derived by ocmbining the first order 
conditicns for optimal  p  and  q2.  Its interpretation is that the 
marginal revenue product of a marginal retained worker  in the injured 
sector should be equal to a weighted average of the reservation wage and —25— 
his marginal revenue product in the favored sector.  This weighting 
reflects tne fact that the laid off worger will be reernployed  with some 
probability. 
When  >  p  > o  it is straightforward to show that the 
equilibrium employment decisions are constrained efficient.  In 
equilibrium, eacn firm equates toe marginal revenue product of toe 
marginal retained worker to the reservation wage, which is a necessary 
condition for welfare maximization gi/en that  0.  Moreover, 
0  is optimal because, at these prices,  q1  >  1(q2)  implies that 
the marginal revenue product of toe average laid off worker in the 
injured sector is below the reservation wage. 
The more interesting case is when  p* >  p  and at least some laid 
off workers are reemployed in equilibrium;  u > 0.  At the equilibrium 
corresponding  to these prices, condition (6) odds  and condition (7) 
holds,  but  condition (8)  fails.  To see this, recall that in 
equilibrium, the marginal  revenue products of the marginal retained 
worker in sector 2, and at'  the average new worker in sector 1, are each 
equated to market clearing wage for sector 2's labor hiring ball  (w). 
Moreover, this wage is equal to the reservation wage  (w0),  unless 
unemployment is zero in sector 2,  in which case  0  1.  Since  q2 > 
Z(q2),  it follows that 
— 0)w  Ow 
(1  — 9)w  + 
3P1f'(mL(q1) — pZ(q,))Z(q2) 
( ( 
—  e)w  + OP,f'(mL(q2) 
+ 
pZ(q2))q2. —26— 
Thus âondition (8) fails in equili*itma when  p < p*.  Too few workers 
are hid off from the injured sector! 
This surprising result has a straightforward intuition. 
Equilibrium layoff deoiSions are profit—maximizing.  However, when  p  > 
p,  there is an externality to layoff decisions which sector 2  firms 
ignore.  Laying oft more, higher quality, workers increases the  average 
quality of the pool of unanployed, which increases the average quality 
of  new workers hired in sector  one.  At the margin, the loss of profits 
in sector  2 are of second order importance, while the gain in profits in 
sector 1  is of fii'st order impbrtsncè.  Thus total welfare goes up. 
We next show that an exit subsidy to workers in the injured sector 
can achióve conàtriinèd efficienoy.  Suppose that all Workers  leaving 
jobs in the injured sector 2 are paid a subsidy  S.  The wags  to 
retained workers in that sector must be raised by  the full amount cf the 
subsidy to induce them tostay.  Consequently, firms in the injured 
sector kiill be induced to layoff more workers,  maximizing  profits by 
equating the marginal revenue product  of the marginal retained worker to 
the mirket-clearing wage in the labor hiring hafl plus  the subsidy. 
Other equilibrium conditions are as before.  Therefore, 
P2f'(mLCq2)) 
a w + S 
• (1 — 
e)w0 + ew + S 
• (1 
— 
e)w0 + eP1f'(mL(q1) 
+  (q2))Z(q2) 
+ $ 
Comparing this condition with condition (8), the optimal subsidy 
satisfies —27— 
S  Z(q2flZ(q2)q2 
- 
Z(q2) 
which is strictly positive for  0  > 0.  The optimal exit subsidy  is 
Pareto improving if  it is combined with appropriate tmo  sun transfer 
payments 
This  discussIon  is summarized by  tne  following  p"oposition. 
PropositIon  3.  A  policy of ad0stment assistance  is  warranted on 
efficiency grounds whenever the second period terms of trade shock 
is of sufficient magnitude to induce some labor reallocation from 
the injured to the favored sector. 
VI.  Concluaton 
We  have  attempted to explore  how  an  economy  responds to a  terms of 
trade shock  when  current employers  know more about  the quality of  tneir 
workers than  do  potential  employers located in another sector.  Three 
main results emerge from our  analysis.  First, in such  an  economy, 
sectoral  shocks give rise to a situation in which  many of  those  laid  off 
from  injured sector firms fail  to find employment elsewhere in the 
economy, despite the fact that the  value of their marginal pr0000t In 
the favored sector would be greater than the prevailing wage.  We define 
this as structural unemployment.  Second, due to the interaction of 
layoff and  hiring decisions,  sectoral unemployment rates are not 
monotonje in the size  of sectoral shocks.  Third,  if  the sectoral  shock 
is of sufficient magnitude, a case can be made on efficiency grounds for 
providing adjustment assistance to workers leaving the injured sector. The simple model we have developed can be extended in several 
directions, to which we believe these basic results are rcbust.  We 
mention here some of the potentially more interesting possibilities. 
Greenwald's (1986) analysis suggests a couple of natural 
extensiàns.  The first concerns cur lodeling cf labcr Markets.  We have 
modeled labor market institutions ma way that rules cut raiding by 
assumption.  Hcweverl cur set up is formally equivalent to the "offer 
matching" assumption employed by Greenwald and  by tlilgrcm  and  Oster 
(1987) in which raidsdo not occur in equilibrium;  A model in which 
raids can occur in equilibrium  is that of Lazear (1985) due  to C  irar 
speoific quality attributes.  In  his set up, it is the higher quality 
workers that gain interfirm mobility as a  result of raidi.  As such, the 
possibility of iuch raids is unlikely to alter in a  fundamental way the 
nature of the structural unemployment that arises in our.  model, which 
occurs at the low end of  the quality spectrum. 
We could also introduoe random quits  as in Greenwald  and  Gibbons 
and Katz (1987),  This would capture the idea that workers leave  jobs 
for other exogenous  reasons.  The addition of random quits would 
faoilitate seotoral  mobility, by increasing the average quality of the 
pool of  unemployed in each sector, but would  not resolve the fundamental 
adverie selection  problem that gives rise to our results.  In fact, by 
promoting mntereectoral  hiring activity,  random quits would  increase the 
range of price shocks for which adjustment assistance is warranted. 
Gibbons  and Katz extend the Greenwald model to two sectors, but 
assume technological differences between sectors which make one sector —29— 
sensitive to labor quality differences and the other not.  While toe 
authors explore the intersectoral wage and mobility predictions of toe 
model in the presence of random quits, one could presumably study how 
such an economy responds to sectoral snocs  as well. 
A third period could also be added to our model,  This would 
complicate the model considerably, since the retention decision of firms 
in period 2 would provide publicly available information about worker 
quality in period 3.  However, as in Greenwald's model, the addition of 
a third period is likely to intensify the problem of adverse selection 
in this model, reducing further the level of intersectoral labor 
mobility and, as such, exacebating the degree of structural 
unemployment and pushing the economy further away from its  constrained 
Pareto optimum. 
The role of contracts might also be considered.  Our analysis has 
relied on the implicit assumption that employers cannot make credible 
long—term commitments to workers.  However, allowing long—term bilateral 
contracts between a firm and employees would not  alter the  information 
asymmetry between sectors which is at the heart of our results,  In fact 
contracts might further diminish  intersectoral mobility due to tnsurance 
provided to workers.  On the other hand, in a multiperlod extension of 
our model, contracts might in some circumstances facilitate 
intersectoral mobility by enabling workers of different abilities to 
self—select. 
Finally, we note  that our analysis might have some implIcations 
for empirical methodology.  For example, Lillien (1982) estimates a 3C 
linear  relationship  between  unemployment and a  measure of seotoral 
shifts.  The  implicit  underlying  hypotheses is  that  greater sectoral 
shocks  result in more layoffs.  However, our  analysis suggests  that 
sectoral  unemployment rates  are not generally monotonic  in sectoral 
shocks.  Thus a more flexible funotional form might be more appropriate 
for estimation, —31— 
F  oat  riot  es 
.1/  See  Rogerson  (1987)  for  a  two—sector  model  based  on  costly  searon. 
In  Greenwaid's  one—sector  mode.,  worKers  change firms tecause of 
random quit behavior.  Absent these random quits, there would De 
no interfirm labor movement, and no need for it from the 
standpoint of economic efficiency.  We briefly discuss random 
quits in our  concluding section. 
Implicitly, we are assuming that there is a third sector, which 
might be thought of as  'home  production," and with whicn this 
reservation utility  is associated. 
We have modeled labor market institutions tn a way that rules cub 
raiding of retained workers by outside firms.  Formally,  our set 
up is equivalent to the "offer matcning" assumption of Greenwald 
(1986). 
Here we make use of the fact that we are working with a continuum 
of workers Implying a "large numbers" property (Judd, 1985). 
Otherwise the concavity of the production function would  induce 
"risk aversion" In hiring new workers. 
/  E(p)  will always be decreasing In  p  if  f"()  L5 small  in 
absolute value relative to  f'('). 
1/  Given  that the rest of the population chooses to work  In period 1, 
a worker who chooses to work in period I  receives the first period 
wage  W,  while a worker who chooses to remain unemployed receives 
the first period reservation wage  e(1,1).  In the second period, 
a worker who was previously employed say, in sector 2, will receive the wage  wd  with probability  p  and the second period 
reservation wage  wm  with probability  (1  p),  where  o  is the 
probability that  p < p*.  If the worker chooses not  to work in 
the first period, he then enters period 2 thought to be the 
population mean quality  q.  Since second period equilibrium 
f  d  d 
requires that  >  such a worker would choose to 
q  Z(q  q  w  - 
locate in the favored sector and receive  q.  Thus, the worker 
q 
will choose to work in period I  if 
f 
W - e(i,i)  >  q 
-  ÷  (i-p)w°)j, which holds if  and 
q 
M  are not too large. 
It is convenient to work with units of effective rather than 
actual unemployment  though the two measures respond to terms of 
trade shocks in a qualitatively similar fashion. 
0/  This follows from tne fact that the effective wage—price ratio for 
sector 1,  e(l,p)/Z(Y(I/p,m)),  is increasing in  p. 
These results regarding constraIned inefficiency and the 
availability of welfare improving tax instruments are an 
application of a more general analysis in Greenwald and Stigiitz 
(1986), —33— 
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